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Abstract. Apprentice programs offer a method to encourage responsible individual behavior by laying the foundation for 
successful collective property rights.  Apprenticeship has three purposes:  to restrict the rate of entry, to affect the quality of 
the participant, and to create the conditions for collective action for sustainability.  Apprenticeship could be an important 
fishery management tool, particularly in decentralized, adaptive management regimes that require ongoing, multi-party 
negotiation for success.  It is not vocational training; instead it serves a public purpose:  to create the conditions for 
stewardship and participation in management. This perception of collective property right mimics customary practice in some 
successful traditional fisheries such as the Maine lobster fishery where customary practice has been demonstrated both to 
have conservation benefits and to lower enforcement costs.  Case information from Maine's new, statutory lobster apprentice 
program is discussed.   Apprenticeship creates conditions for responsible behavior by creating a stable population that can 
develop long term assurances about expected behavior and can develop credible internal monitoring and sanctions.  In 
addition to requiring a personal investment of time, it provides information about fishing ethics and non-fishing information 
about basic biology, ecology, and participation in the management system. This, because it changes the frame of reference, 
should affect individual behavior both fishing and as participants in management.  Apprenticeship focuses on the individual 
fishing as the principal actor in conservation. The apprenticeship approach bolsters both co-management and, for that matter, 
conventional limited entry programs as well. 
 





No longer is it possible to assert that merely controlling 
fishing mortality or the number of participants will sustain 
the world's fisheries.  Thus fishery management cannot 
avoid rules that are integrally tied to the specifics of the 
fishery in question:  how, when, and where fish are caught 
and how this fits with the ecosystem.  Faced with this 
added complexity, apprenticeship can make a major 
contribution to establishing the context for effective group 
consensus to solve the problem of mutual restraint in a 
world difficult to control from shore.   
 
The National Research Council's Sustaining Marine 
Fisheries (National Research Council 1998) concludes 
that a broader approach to fishery management is 
necessary:  something broader than controlling fishing 
mortality rate through single species management.  It calls 
for management that is ecosystem-based.  It also called 
for developing and encouraging socioeconomic and other 
management incentives that discourage overcapacity and 
that reward conservative and efficient use of marine 
resources and their ecosystems. (p. 7)  
 
The same year, in its Report to Congress, the Ecosystems 
Principles Advisory Panel (National Marine Fisheries 
Service 1998) recommends that fishery management 
councils create Fishery Ecosystem Plans.  The panel 
included consideration of such factors as the limited 
ability to predict ecosystem behavior, the importance of 
diversity, the fact that factors occurring on multiple scales 
are important, and consideration of flows of materials and 
information in complex patterns.  One of the panel's five 
management policies, designed to facilitate the more 
complex management that ecosystem-based management 
represents, is to make local incentives compatible with 
global goals.  
 
Decentralization of management and development of 
systems that are accountable and able to adapt is a 
response to this greater complexity.  It is in this context 
that apprenticeship should be considered as a 
management measure.  
 
Apprenticeship has three purposes:  to restrict the rate of 
entry, to affect the quality of the participant, and to create 
the conditions for collective action for sustainability. 
 
2. DEFINITION OF APPRENTICESHIP 
 
The concept of apprenticeship can be broadly defined to 
include any training or fishery enhancement work 
required as a specific condition of participation in a 
fishery.  Apprenticeship is a concept that is widely used in 
Europe outside the fisheries context and is used to a lesser 
degree in trades and professions in the US. With the 
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exception of Iceland (Palsson 1994), some countries that 
require some form of safety or seamanship training, and 
some traditional societies (Ruddle 1994), apprenticeship 
is not widely documented as a form of entry restriction in 
fisheries.  The safety and seamanship training is required 
for a public purpose (safety) that is separate from the 
conservation and economic efficiency purposes of most 
fishery management so the safety training programs have 
not been given serious scrutiny in the fishery management 
context.   
 
Apprenticeship is not vocational training; it is training to 
fulfill a public purpose.  The stated reason that 
hairdressers, plumbers, and medical doctors are required 
to meet licensing standards is to ensure public safety as 
well as to control entry and bolster wages.  For fishing, 
the public purpose of apprenticeship, in addition to 
regulation of the rate of entry, is to facilitate sustainable 
use of the fishery by creating a common knowledge base 
and quality of participants, a compelling rationale when 
compared to some of the other trades.   
 
Apprenticeship is a form of entry restriction (Townsend 
1990).  While most entry restriction regimes focus on 
achieving the correct number of participants, 
apprenticeship does not directly restrict the number of 
participants.  Instead, it controls both the rate of entry into 
a fishery and the quality of the participants.  It can be 
applied as an additional barrier to entry in fisheries where 
there is limited entry with transferable or non-transferable 
licenses or where entry is determined by a lottery or 
waiting list. It can also be used as a substitute for other 
forms of entry restriction.  
 
True apprenticeship is a form of entry restriction that 
applies only to commercial users.  Nonetheless, it is not 
inconceivable, (though highly unlikely in the politicized 
world of recreational saltwater fishing licensing) that the 
idea of training requirements could be extended to certain 
recreational fisheries.  Hunter safety courses are a 
standard requirement in many states for obtaining a 
recreational hunting license.   
 
An apprenticeship can simply require on-the-boat 
training, which fulfills vocational training and the entry 
restriction functions.  However, to fully serve a public 
purpose of promoting stewardship, an apprenticeship 
should also include non-fishing content that a fisherman 
needs to be a responsible resource user and participant in 
co-management.  This information includes biology and 
ecology, rules and ethics, information about the 
regulatory arena and how to participate in that arena 
effectively. Apprenticeship can also include donation of 
"conservation time," some kind of work requirement for 
stock enhancement or stewardship as is frequently done in 
intertidal clam fisheries.   
 
Apprenticeship differs from many forms of entry 
restriction because it is focused on the individual, and 
more specifically, on the individual who is fishing.  Once 
again, the concept is a broad one and could be 
administered within a licensing system that gives permits 
to vessels or owners rather than on-board fishermen.  In 
the latter case, the practical questions will be whether to 
require training and time invested of the owner or of the 
actual employee fisherman.  The benefits of 
apprenticeship will be the most direct in true 
owner/operator situations where the actual fisherman is 
the person both licensed and accountable on the water. 
 
 
3. MAINE LOBSTER FISHERY 
 
Maines lobster industry is a trap-only fishery comprised 
of vessels about 25-40 feet in length. All boat captains are 
owner-operators and most employ one crew member, 
called a sternman.  
 
In 1995, groundbreaking lobster legislation passed the 
Maine Legislature.  The new law required that any new 
lobster fisherman be required to put in two years practical 
experience prior to obtaining a commercial lobster and 
crab fishing license.  The law also enabled but did not 
require the Maine Department of Marine Resources to 
require educational courses.  The law was passed as an 
alternative to an actual limited entry program that 
controlled the total number of participants in the fishery.   
 
The legislation also established seven Lobster 
Management Zones and a democratically-elected 
governance structure that involved Lobster Management 
Policy Councils (called lobster zone councils) and 
referendum decision-making by lobstermen on three 
topics:  the trap limit below the state cap (now 800), the 
time fished, and the numbers of traps fished on a trawl.  
  
It is too early for a meaningful evaluation of the program 
and to date, none has been attempted.  During the five 
years since implementation, a predictable array of 
practical and political events has occurred so that to date, 
there is no clear track record for the apprenticeship as a 
form of entry restriction.  During the first year, the Maine 
Department of Marine Resources undertook the massive 
effort of qualifying the existing 7000 lobstermen.  As a 
result of the political outcry from people who were 
excluded from the fishery as a result of that process, the 
Legislature eased up on restrictions the next year, 
allowing additional entry from people with only minor 
history in the fishery.  At the same time, the trap limit and 
the predictable human reaction of wanting to fish up to 
the new limit, caused an escalation of traps by those who 
had previously fished only lightly.  These two factors 
caused established lobstermen to perceive a huge influx of 
entry.  This resulted in the successful campaign to get a 
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two-year moratorium on entry passed in 1998.  At the 
same time, an owner/operator provision was passed, 
codifying what is the standard practice in the fishery. 
 
The two-year practical experience requirement has been 
defined by regulation as a minimum of 200 days over a 
minimum of two years.  An apprentice must have a daily 
log signed by his/her captain and countersigned every 50 
days by the local Maine Marine Patrol officer.  Some 
lobstermen are willing to let any sternman be an 
apprentice under them.  Others are extremely choosy and 
might, for example, only allow a nephew or son the 
privilege.  Some members of the industry have suggested 
that a letter should go out to all apprentice sponsors, 
laying out the responsibility that sponsoring someone 
entails. 
 
Maine does not require any educational courses as part of 
the two-year lobster apprenticeship.  The law is 
permissive, however, and we have collected information 
from the industry about their preferences for courses, 
should they be required.  Virtually universally, 
lobstermen wanted courses to be limited to things that 
served the public purpose:  either conservation or safety.  
Topics that received support for inclusion in an 
educational offering included basic lobster biology and 
ecology, local fishing ethics, rules and regulations and 
their purpose, the structure of the fishery management 
agencies, and how to participate in management at 
various levels.  Lobstermen did not support any 
vocational training beyond what would be taking place in 





Current fishery managers face a highly confusing 
situation.  Assumptions underlying conventional 
management policy have changed, and many commonly-
used management tools have proven to be unreliable in 
creating stewardship and conservative behavior. 
 
The basic assumptions underlying discussions about the 
common pool dilemma have changed dramatically in the 
thirty years since Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the 
Commons." (Hardin 1968)  This does not change the 
challenge of managing a common pool resource, 
articulated by Hardin as, "mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon." It does, however, change the context in 
which policy is made.  
 
A distinction has been drawn between open access 
resources, common property resources, and privatized 
resources.  Hardin's tragedy was one that comes from 
open access, where no one owns a resource (Ciriacy-
Wantrup and Bishop 1975).  Common property resources 
are those where access and terms of use are controlled by 
a distinct community, an institutional arrangement that 
has proven successful in numerous cases. (Wade 1994, 
Berkes 1985, Hanna 1990, Eggertson 1993, Feeney et al -
1996, McKay and Acheson 1987)  
 
No longer can we assume that users of the resource are 
unboundedly rational, maximizers of individual utility.  
Instead, it is more appropriate to assume that users are 
constrained by norms, imperfect information, sub-optimal 
equilibria, path dependencies, and contradictory goals, 
and that they are capable of cooperation under certain 
conditions (Simon 1954, 1987, North 1990, Sugiden 
1990, Taylor 1990, Conlisk 1996, Ostrom 1999). 
 
Our view of fishery resources has changed as more has 
been learned about the complexity of their biology and 
oceanography.  Fisheries can no longer be considered 
homogeneous across their range. Ecosystem, rather than 
single species management is recommended, albeit not 
yet developed. (National Marine Fisheries Service 1998, 
National Research Council 1998)  Control of fishing 
mortality while still important, is not enough (Wilson et al 
1994). 
 
The role of uncertainty in science, in policymaking, and 
in the information that harvesters use must now be 
acknowledged in the development of both theory and 
policy. (Ludwig 1993, Holling 1978)  The theory of 
complex adaptive systems (Holland 1998) offers more 
effective guidance to a policy maker than a deterministic 
view of fisheries.   
 
In an effort to control fishing mortality, fishery policy has 
focused on limiting access, and/or privatizing resources 
through measures such as individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs). Conventional approaches to limited access do not 
attempt to directly resolve the conflict between the 
individual and social incentives (Wilson 1994). And, in 
fact, neither conventional limited entry nor individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) have produced reliable 
conservation outcomes. (Copes 1986, Townsend, 1990) 
Townsend's  (1990) evaluation of many limited entry 
fisheries demonstrates that limited entry has neither 
reliably eliminated capital stuffing nor obviated the need 
for an escalating set of direct input and output controls in 
order to achieve necessary conservation.  The shift from 
common property to exclusive access rights, in many 
resource contexts, has, at times, exacerbated the 
conservation problem (Ciriacy and Wantrup 1975, Blaikie 
& Brookfield 1987, Schmink & Wood 1987, Van Ginkel 
1988, Hanna 1990)  Furthermore, in fisheries with ITQs 
privatizing the rights to the fish stock have not eliminated 
enforcement problems.  (Townsend 1990).   
 
Decentralized management that is community-based, 
adaptive and capable of learning is emerging as an 
approach that offers promise in dealing with this 
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complexity.  It is in this context, where fishermen and 
managers will be obliged to successfully negotiate the 
terms of fishery management, that apprenticeship can 
make a major contribution.  The role of fishery manager 
has changed.  Formerly, a fishery manager was someone 
who must arrive, through rational analysis, at the 
appropriate quota and then impose and enforce it from the 
top, through bureaucratic authority.  Now a manager must 
try to develop collective institutions within the fishery 
that can result in conservative behavior by those 
individuals involved in use of the resource. 
 
 
5.  PURPOSE OF APPRENTICESHIP 
  
It is particularly important to look at apprenticeship in 
light of the trend toward decentralized management. 
Apprenticeship directly, rather than indirectly, addresses 
the need to stimulate stewardship in a fishery in order to 
achieve conservation goals.  Apprenticeship operates in 
three ways:  Restricts the rate of entry, establishes an 
environment where stewardship is part of the culture of a 
fishery; and provides the tools that make stewardship 
possible.  
 
Apprenticeship can contribute to creating effective 
collective property rights and aligning individual actions 
and interests with the common good.  It can contribute to 
creating the conditions for stewardship and enabling 
collective action to solve the problem of mutual restraint. 
Apprenticeship addresses a number of the conditions that 
both Ostrom (1990, 1999) and Pinkerton and Weinstein 
(1995) list as characteristic of successful resource 
management regimes including group boundaries, 
accountability, effective management/locally appropriate 
rules, accountable monitoring and effective sanctions, 
good public discussion, adequate conflict resolution in 
fishing and in rulemaking, and adaptiveness and ability to 
learn.   
 
 
5.1  Restrict rate of entry 
 
Apprenticeship requires a future entrant to invest of his or 
her own time and attention in the fishery.  Depending on 
the length of time and degree of attention required, 
apprenticeship can greatly reduce opportunistic entry.   
Apprenticeship requires that someone desiring to enter a 
fishery make a deliberate decision to do so and commit 
time and work to becoming eligible, work that precludes 
other opportunities in the mean time.  This makes it 
impossible, for example, for someone to quickly invest in 
gear and/or boat to take advantage of a recently 
discovered concentration of product in a fishery.   
 
The barrier to entry that apprenticeship represents, while 
translatable to cost or investment, is substantively 
different from the purely financial investment required for 
the purchase of a transferable license or quota.  An 
investment in a license or quota must be capitalized, 
which requires an entrant to borrow money and start large 
to pay the entry fee.  This sets up an incentive that 
directly opposes the conservation intent.  In contrast, 
apprenticeship requires the investment of time and 
attention on the job, something that a young person from 
a fishing community can give without having to borrow.  
It enables a new entrant to start small, build sweat equity, 
and retain the ability to adapt (by not fishing) to changing 
resource conditions.   
 
Apprenticeship can provide greater flexibility in 
controlling the rate of entry, compared to most 
conventional entry restriction mechanisms that rely on 
fixed numerical thresholds. It is not legal in most states to 
use educational requirements solely as entrance barriers to 
a trade or profession.  However, particularly when fishing 
apprenticeship is in its infancy, it is possible to affect the 
rate of entry by varying parameters such as the time span 
of an existing apprenticeship program or the rigor of 
training and evaluation procedures.  This provides the 
policy maker with a tool that has fewer of the political 
and legal hurdles that pertain in more direct and absolute 
changes in license availability or ownership rights. 
 
In Maine, the apprenticeship law provides a formal, 
institutionalized imitation of a social practice that had 
existed in the fishery previously.  Entry into lobstering in 
a given area has always been contingent to some degree 
on acceptance by those fishermen fishing the same area. 
(Acheson 1988) However, prior to the passage of the 
lobster apprenticeship law, the fishery experienced a 
period of unprecedented growth.  High lobster abundance 
and changes in technology made lobstering easier to 
succeed at and these factors eroded the traditional barriers 
to entry that functioned through lobster clusters and a 
complex social structure that regulated who fished, where, 
and with what standards.  (Acheson 1988, 2000, Acheson 
and Brewer 2000)  Many of the new entrants did not have 
the experience in the mores of lobstering, and contributed 
to a rapid escalation of effort.    
 
Only two years' data exists for apprentice licenses in 
Maine (Table 1.) The number of apprentices in 1999 
increased 118% over 1998 largely due to a change in the 
law that required student licensees to participate in the 
formal apprenticeship program.  However, relative to the 
total number of licenses, the percentage of apprentices 
remains low:  3.4% in 1998 and 8.1% in 1999.  Even in 
1999, there are fewer than half as many apprentices as 
there are fishermen age 61 and older.  These numbers are 
a good indicator of the change that apprenticeship has 
created in the fishery.  Previously, holding a lobster 
license was a basic matter of identity for members of 
coastal communities, whether or not they actively fished, 
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and as lobster abundance and technology changed, this 
increasingly included wage earners and retired people as 
well as members of traditional fishing families.  This 
provided a huge pool of potential fishermen who were 
available to enter opportunistically when conditions either 
in the fishery or in the rest of the coastal economy 
warranted.  Formalized apprenticeship now appears to 









1997 6406 NA NA 
1998 6321 217 NA 
1999 5989 487 1063 
 
Table 1. Maine lobster licenses 
 
 
5.2 Affect quality of participant  
  
Whereas most entry restrictions control the number of 
participants, apprenticeship directly addresses the quality 
and training of new entrants.   
 
It is important to note that apprenticeship differs from 
many management tools in that it recognizes the unique 
status of the individual working fisherman in the 
conservation equation.  Apprenticeship operates at the 
level of the individual fisherman:  the person who is 
actually onboard, interacting directly with the resource, 
rather than on owners or vessels.  This fact gives 
apprenticeship tremendous power because conservation 
actually takes place on the boat, not in the boardroom.  
Fishing takes place out of sight of the general public and 
far beyond the effective reach of most enforcement 
authorities. Detection of rule violations by authorities is 
very difficult, so that the peer pressure and individual 
values are important deterrents to illegal activity.  This 
means that the norms of those actually doing the fishing, 
those being addressed directly by apprenticeship, are far 
more important to conservation than they would be in a 
more controllable situation.  
 
Apprenticeship places an explicit focus on the individual 
responsibility that a fisherman has both in fishing and in 
participating as someone who holds responsibility in a 
decentralized management system.   
 
 
5.3 Create conditions for collective action for 
sustainability  
 
Apprenticeship can facilitate creation of the conditions 
necessary for effective collective action for sustainability. 
It contributes to group definition, creating boundaries 
within which trust and negotiation can take place. It 
provides information to create a common pool of 
knowledge, expectations, and ethics for participants in a 
fishery, thereby changing both values and behavior.  And 
it provides orientation to the participatory arena within 
which all fishermen involved in decentralized 
management must operate.   
 
Apprenticeship creates a stable population of participants.  
Because of the time required to fulfill the requirements, 
the individuals in an apprenticeship fishery are relatively 
stable and predictable when compared to a system without 
apprenticeship and with license transferability.  This 
facilitates the creation of group boundaries and the 
elimination of free riders, allowing discount rates to 
remain low and institution building to occur.  It creates a 
situation where participants in the fishery can establish 
long term assurances about the expected behavior of other 
participants, a necessary condition for mutual restraint 
(Ostrom, 1990, Wilson 1994).  This is not possible in a 
situation with license transferability without 
apprenticeship. 
 
Apprenticeship can facilitate development of effective 
internal monitoring and sanctions, thereby improving 
voluntary compliance with rules. Effective sanctions are 
essential for effective management.  Because it is 
unrealistic to expect the force of law to be effective 
enough on the water to provide adequate external 
deterrence, voluntary compliance is not only the most 
cost-effective option, it is essential.  (Ostrom 1990, 
Sutinen et al 1990) 
 
The benefits of group formation and effective sanctions 
operate both with respect to externally derived rules and 
in the often invisible internal structure of a fishery. In 
every fishery there are fishing practices that are 
commonly accepted.  Acceptable practices involve 
appropriate and inappropriate ways of sharing 
information, standards for showing respect to or handling 
conflict with other fishermen fishing in the same area, and 
insuring against unsafe practices.  In a fixed gear fishery 
such as a demersal or pelagic longline fishery or the 
Maine lobster fishery acceptable practices include such 
things as how to set trawls relative to other fishermen's 
gear or relative to the tide. They also include a number of 
informal common courtesy practices that vary from area 
to area.  In a mobile gear fishery they include procedures 
for lining up to share a tow, a specific path where towing 
is possible on hard bottom. These are externalities that 
require continuous negotiation and cooperation to operate 
well.  Fishermen who disregard these informal rules 
reduce the efficiency of responsible fishermen and 
degrade the fishery.  If the violators cannot be controlled, 
behavior sinks to the lowest common denominator, as 
responsible fishermen are forced to respond in kind in 
order to compete.  Apprenticeship can establish the 
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conditions where such negotiation, cooperation, and 
conflict resolution can function effectively.   
 
The information dissemination that occurs during an 
apprenticeship also contributes to group formation and 
effective sanctions.  Two types of information are 
transmitted: ethics and standard practices that obtain in 
the fishery and non-fishing information about biology, 
ecology, rules, and process.  This occurs in the on-the-
boat work requirement and in the coursework.   
 
Traditionally, ethics and standard practices in fisheries 
have been transmitted through on-the-job training.  The 
results of this are uneven and dependent on the degree of 
teaching done by the captain and his/her standards.  
 
In the Maine lobster fishery, apprenticeship mimics a 
traditional practice at a time when those traditions are 
changing. The state of Maine issues lobstering licenses 
that ostensibly allow licensees to set their traps anywhere 
in state waters. In practice, however, entry into the 
fishery, and the spatial area available to the setting of 
traps, are controlled by harbor-based groups of fishermen. 
The membership of each harbor group is comprised of 
persons residing nearby, many of whom come from 
fishing families. Relative outsiders who enter the fishery 
directly, without serving as a sternman in the area, are 
usually able to gain fishing privileges only after enduring 
a couple years of hazing. They usually suffer losses of 
capital and labor in the form of molestation and damage 
of fishing gear and other property, as well as shunning or 
direct verbal communications. These practices have 
diminished somewhat in recent years, however, 
undermined by unprecedented lobster abundance, 
technological and socioeconomic changes, and increased 
state involvement in management and enforcement. 
(Acheson and Brewer, 2000). Because of these changes, 
many lobstermen we interviewed supported using 
apprenticeship to standardize expectations for teaching 
ethics and standard practices. 
 
Non-fishing information is something not normally 
provided to or required of fishermen.  Basic biological 
and ecological information about the fishery they pursue 
and the ecology of the area in which they fish (as opposed 
to stock assessment models) provide the baseline 
understanding of the system they use.  It is surprising that, 
while managers and the general public often decry 
fishermen's irresponsibility and, sometimes, ignorance, 
fishermen are not required to acquire this basic 
information.  In most fisheries, there is virtually no non-
regulatory forum in which managers, scientists, and 
fishermen can talk about the life cycle of commercially 
fished species. Simple information such as the fact that 
most commercial species have a pelagic life stage can be 
a revelation to a fisherman who has never been exposed to 
marine science.  
A good apprentice program also provides information 
about rules, management agencies, and processes as well 
as skills necessary for effective participation in 
management.  These include such skills as conflict 
resolution and meeting protocols.  A byproduct of the 
skill acquisition should be added confidence and more 
effective participation.   
 
Decentralized management makes the acquisition of both 
the scientific and the participatory skills particularly 
important.  Co-management or community based 
management requires discussion and negotiation among 
diverse groups:  other fishermen, managers, scientists, and 
the general public.  This is what Dietz and Stern (1998) 
call analytic deliberation.  The common knowledge base 
will strengthen the group formation within the fishery and 
may facilitate their arriving at consensus.  Both the skills 
and the knowledge will help the multi-party deliberation 
process to integrate scientific analysis and deliberation 
and manage conflict.   
 
All of this assumes that acquisition of knowledge and 
skills can change behavior.  In fact, apprenticeship should 
help align individual rationality with the common good.  
It does so by changing the bounds of fishermens 
rationality  the frame of reference of information and 
values which informs their ecological economic, and 
negotiation decisions.  While altering the bounds of 
rationality alters subsequent actions, the nature of these 
changes is not entirely predictable. In this regard 
apprenticeship is an act of trust/faith. Like co-
management, there is little conclusive proof of its 
effectiveness/benefits. Until such evidence is available, 
apprenticeship is initiated in the spirit of Horace Mann of 
Massachusetts (1846), who said, "The property of this 
Commonwealth is pledged for the education of all its 
youth, up to such a point as will  prepare them for the 
adequate performance of their social and civil duties." 
 
 
6.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is not in the scope of this paper to provide a discussion 
of implementation recommendations.  Certain comments, 
however, are appropriate.   
 
Nothing has been said above about costs of 
apprenticeship.  While the costs of developing and 
maintaining curriculum are appropriate public sector 
investments, in certain circumstances they could also be 
shared with industry if the program is developed 
collaboratively.  Cost sharing with apprentices is 
appropriate to cover administrative and maintenance 
costs.  
 
The requirements of an apprenticeship should provide 
both fishing experience and non-fishing information.  
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Design of an apprentice curriculum should draw on other 
apprentice programs and should keep in mind the explicit 
public purposes of the program.  Apprenticeship programs 
should be designed and maintained in a collaborative 
process with industry and managers.  Technology 
provides a number of options for delivery of the 
educational portion of a curriculum in innovative ways. 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Apprenticeship should be considered as a management 
tool that restricts rate of entry, affects the quality of the 
participants, and creates conditions for collective action 
for sustainability.  It is particularly important for 
decentralized adaptive management systems that require 
ongoing negotiation or analytic deliberation with many 





 Henry P. Kendall Foundation, Boston, MA has supported 
my work in developing an educational curriculum for the 
Maine lobster apprentice program.  Ted Ames and Dr. 
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